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ABSTRACT
Underwood, Joshua C. M.A. School of Public and International Affairs, Wright State
University, 2020. Game of Survival: External Actors’ Support for Separatists.
This research develops a novel model for external actors’ support for separatists.
Three variables measuring external actors’ support are identified through two case
studies, Kosovo Liberation Army and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, with an
emphasis on Military Aid’s impact. The variables are then applied to a quantitative
analysis of external actors’ support in a dataset of 75 observations during the years 19912020, utilizing the Uppsala Conflict Data Program External Support Dataset. The
findings for this research show that Military Aid and Moral Support improve the
probability of survival for a separatist group. A deeper analysis reveals that military aid
among the three major powers (People’s Republic of China, United States of America,
Russian Federation) does not have a greater impact. Finally, the PRC’s Moral Support
has a stronger impact than the USA’s and RF’s Moral Support.
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I.

Introduction

The recent Russian involvement in Eastern Ukraine (2014) and Georgia (2008)
conflicts has renewed debates on how external state actors help separatist groups survive.
Specifically, recent studies have reopened the discussion and given new relevance to the
methods by which separatist groups survive conflicts (Florea 2017, Saideman 2001, Tir
2005, Toft 2010). For separatist groups, receiving aid from an external actor can have a
significant impact on their chances of survival. There are a variety of forms of aid that an
external actor may offer to a separatist group to give them the advantage in their fight for
self-determination. External actors may give economic, military aid, or moral support to
the separatist group. This begs the question; how does an external actor’s aid impact the
chance of survival for a separatist group?
Survivability for separatist groups depends on the necessary success that the group
has against the central government. Contributions to the separatist conflict literature focus
on how foreign states use aid to influence separatist wars; however, this does not directly
explain how their support improves the secessionist likelihood of survival. Most
contributions in the literature on separatist wars focus on similar types of aid but have not
looked at these three particular types of aid, and their impact on separatist survival.
Specifically, none of the literature argues that in order to improve the chances of survival
for a separatist group, the external actor must provide military aid.
1

The research here will bridge this gap in the literature by presenting greater nuance
to how external actors improve the probability of separatist survival.
A new model is constructed to consider three types of external actor aid that
increases the probability of survival for a separatist group. Specifically, the model will
measure a set of novel variables that carefully consider how external actor aid can impact
the probability of survival for a separatist group. After discussing the literature on external
actor support for separatist groups, the separatist group’s probability of survival is analyzed
through the successful case of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the failed case of
the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE). These two case studies will establish the
impact of military aid on a separatist group’s probability of survival. Lastly, a quantitative
analysis of 75 separatist cases is constructed based on the variables identified for this
research.
Military aid, economic aid, and moral support are not novel variables; however,
this research takes the unique approach of approaching each of these variables as if they
are capable of increasing the probability of survival for a separatist group. Sequentially,
seeing which type of aid improves the probability of survival for a separatist group may
help shed light on how separatist groups persist and strive to gain international recognition
to establish an independent state. By looking at each of these variables, the type of aid a
separatist group will seek from an external actor can be determined. Furthermore, it is
important to also consider why external actors will provide support to separatist group.
External actors provide aid to a separatist group for three key reasons. First,
naturally an external actor will support a separatist group with which they share
transnational linkages and kinship, especially while simultaneously making an appeal to

2

their domestic audience. The external actor may see an opportunity to garner support from
their domestic audience through an intervention in a neighboring state’s conflict if it is in
support of a kinship group that is being oppressed or having their rights violated by the
neighboring state.
The second reason is more pragmatic: the external actor may benefit materially
from improving a separatist group’s probability of survival. The argument could be made
from a realist perspective that all states are self-interested, and when an external actor
intervenes to support a separatist group, they are essentially helping the group on a quid
pro quo basis. Some external actors may extend their influence in specific parts of the world
specifically for the benefits they may gain from helping separatist groups in a particular
region. In particular, the research here assumes that world powers like the United States of
America (U.S.A), Russian Federation (RF), and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are
the likely external actors to exert their influence beyond their home regions to gain allies
in areas they view as strategic, receiving material benefits (sea ports, bases, etc.).
The third reason external actors support foreign separatist groups is to gain security
partners through which the external actor exerts greater influence abroad. The benefits of
this action may not be readily apparent; an external actor may support a separatist
movement because they view them as an ally which would yield more long-term
investment. Establishing this partnership could greatly improve the separatist likelihood of
survival. Security partnerships established through external actor support of separatist
movements can be utilized to promote the values inherent to the culture/interests of the
external actor. Subnational organizations like separatist groups will likely rely on the
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external actor for support which may exacerbate tensions between them and their central
government in future relations.
These fundamental insights provide greater depth to the existing literature by
analyzing the impact of variables novel to the field of separatist conflict. This new research
establishes new layers to the discussion on how separatist groups survive.

4

II.

Literature Review

Civil Wars
Throughout history there have been numerous wars fought by subnational groups
wanting to achieve independence. Some of these wars have been categorized as civil wars,
while others are known as secessionist wars. Within the Civil Wars conflict literature,
various causal factors are debated to explain what motivates these groups to take up arms
against the central political authority. This leads to the question, what is the difference
between civil wars and separatist wars? Civil wars, as defined by Fearon and Laitin (2003:
76) “…[I]nvolve fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized,
nonstate groups who sought either to take control of a government, to take power in a
region, or to use violence to change government policies.” In other words, civil wars are
fought between the central government and a group within the state with military force
wanting to take control of the central government.
Pervious scholars have argued that civil wars are started because of grievances (Gurr,
1970). Grievances are tied to discrimination and disadvantages between conflict parties as
well as distinctive cultural differences (Gurr, 1993). Additionally, Collier and Hoeffler
(2004) argue that civil wars are driven by greed or grievances. Specifically, they found that
civil wars occur when states are too weak or poor to fight the rebels or when warlords try
to loot natural resources to enrich themselves (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Furthermore, large
groups that have been excluded and have less access to power are
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more likely to start a conflict (Cederman, et al., 2010). Moreover, countries that are
democratic and ethnically diverse are more/less likely to engage in civil wars (Elbadawi
and Sambanis 2002). In sum, civil wars are conflicts that are established by groups that
are subsumed by greed, wishing to enrich themselves or take control of the central
government. In the following section, separatist war is defined, and the interchangeable
usage of the terms separatist and secessionist is explained.

Separatist Wars
There are a variety of distinctions between separatist wars; specifically, separatist
conflicts occur when groups seeking independence attempt to establish their own state,
while separatist autonomism occurs when groups seek self-governance without
independence. Finally, separatist-merger conflicts are characterized by a separatist group
aiming for reunification with another state (Heralcides 1997: 682). Moreover, separatist
wars occur because subnational identity are not aligned with their state which is related to
nationalist identity (Fearon, 2004). Separatists not only seek separation from the
recognized state in which it resides, but seek independence while lacking international
recognition (Florea, 2014). For the purpose of this research, we utilize the separatist war
definition presented by Wood (1981). A secessionist war, as defined by Wood (1981: 110),
is “…[A] demand for formal withdrawal from a central political authority by a member
unit or units on the basis of a claim to independent sovereignty status.” Evidently, there is
a clear distinction between the features of a separatist war and a civil war. Secessionist
wars differ from civil wars because the secessionist group wants to formally withdraw from
their sovereign state to establish their own independence. In sum, secessionist wars are not
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civil wars because of the demand to withdrawal from the central state and establish an
independent state. This research builds off this established distinction to explain how
separatist groups exploit self-determination movements in their struggle against the central
state, also known as the “parent” state.

Self-Determination Movements
The right to self-determination was the main focus for human right advocates
following the dissolution of the Austria-Hungarian empire at the end of World War I.
Self-Determination Movements (SDMs) gives these groups the legal right to seek
autonomy (Ali 2014: 419). According to the “United Nations Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 1, 993 and 999 United Nations Treaty Series (U.N.T.S.)
stipulates that:
‘[A]ll people have the right to self-determination… The State Parties to
the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the
administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the
realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in
conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations” (Ali 2014:
427).
Under the United Nations (UN) Charter, any group has the legal right to separate
from their parent state, and therefore, the parent state shall respect that group’s right.
Any group that feels their rights are being violated or being oppressed by the central state
has the right to initiate self-determination.
On the other hand, some scholars have argued that international law does not
grant any group the right to self-determinate from their parent state. Secessionist groups
challenge the central (parent) state’s territorial integrity and their sovereignty (Sterio
2014: 299). Separatist groups have the right to self-determination; however, international
7

law argues that this leads to war and instability within the region. The wars fought over
self-determination have led some external actors to support separatist groups. In order to
contextualize these conflicts, an analysis of how external and internal actors impact civil
wars is essential.

External Actors and Internal Actors in Civil Wars
By definition, a civil war is a war between state and internal, subnational actors.
The behavior of external actors in a civil war is largely driven by internal actors.
Specifically, scholars have looked at the behavior of governments within these wars.
Lacina (2006) argues that governments that are more democratic endure fewer conflictrelated deaths and that institutional constraints affect the outcome of civil wars. Sometimes
a government’s institutional constraints can force them to compromise with opposition
groups. Rodríguez-Franco (2016) argues that governments increase taxation of domestic
elites to increase their forces’ chances of winning against their opponents. Governments
will use this increased revenue to manufacture weapons and resources to support their
troops. Stanton (2015) states that governments raise militias to attack the opposition’s
civilian support base. Furthermore, Butt (2017) finds that a central government will use
various methods to combat a secessionist movement depending on the level of support
from a third party, ranging from their institutional constraints to using militia.
However, the focus of civil wars literature has thus far been on how external actors
have influenced this type of conflict. The broad literature on civil wars examines the
duration of civil wars and how external actors’ influence lengthens them. Regan (2002:
1996) examines how third-party intervention can affect the duration of civil wars. The
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evidence the author finds is that intervention decreases the likelihood of wars ending within
the next month. The author finds that external intervention is poorly managed and only
prolongs the war rather than shortening them, while policymakers can choose when to
intervene in order to end a war. Moreover, Aydin (2006) analyzes how diplomacy plays a
critical role in external actors’ intervention. The author found that diplomatic interventions
are a part of conflict management and can change the trajectory of civil wars.
Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) examine how third-party states impact civil
wars. Their findings show that interventions occur because of third-party strategic
decisions to do so and that there is a greater chance for civil wars to stall and potentially
prolong during this period. The prolonging of wars correlates with Regan’s (2002)
findings. The authors suggest that further research is critical to the field in trying to
understand third-party behavior and interests. The broad literature of civil wars has
discovered that external actors’ influence only prolongs the conflict. These conclusions
reinforce how crucial external actors can be in civil wars. However, they fail to explain the
reasons for external actors’ involvement.

External Actors Involvement
Previous research has attempted to explain external actors’ behavior and reasons
for involvement in civil wars. Kathman (2010), Regan (1998), Mitchell (1970),
Cunningham (2010) and Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) examine the
conditions and behavior of third-party groups’ involvement. Kathman (2010) focuses
research on geopolitical wars that pose various types of threats to neighboring countries
that other third-party interveners may never face. The author finds that enthusiasm to
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intervene varies across third-party states because their threat reduction is different from
other third-party interveners. Regan (1998) finds that external actors intervene on
conditions that may involve humanitarian crises, while Mitchell (1970) finds that
intervention occurs when ethnic groups in civil wars seek to gain resources from external
actors. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2010) find that external actors that have an
independent agenda extend wars significantly longer. While Cunningham (2011) contends
that external actors are less likely to support strong rebel groups, Mitchell (1970) argues
that transnational linkages and interstate rivalries are crucial for rebels gaining support
from external actors. Khosla (1999) examines third world countries who have intervened
in ethnic conflicts and expands research on the interventions. The author finds that half of
the interventions were initiated by states within the same region. Also, regional powers are
more likely to provide resources to ethnonationality or militant sects because of their
positions against the government, especially the ethnonationalist groups who were seeking
autonomy from their state.
These authors show that resources influence how external actors behave and
explain why they have taken interest in certain conflicts. The behavior and interests of
external actors are crucial for the field because it offers insights broadening our
understanding of the motivations of those actors. However, they fail to explain separatist
groups’ requirements for survival. The next section will discuss what separatist groups
need to survive and maintain their territory.
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Necessities for Survival
Though separatist groups may not have the same access to resources as the central
government, some groups find various ways to survive. Previous research has analyzed
how some separatist groups have managed to survive throughout the war and beyond. Most
contributions to the literature designate these groups as “de facto states” because they have
their own autonomy but have not established independence as a state. Some of the de facto
states have managed to survive and finding the key necessities in what helps separatists
succeed is critical in understanding their survival. The literature on de facto states
establishes criteria for why these states have succeeded. As stated by King (2001: 525),
“First, the territorial separatists of the early 1990s have become the state
builders of the early 2000s, creating de facto countries whose ability to field
armed forces, control their own territory, educate their children, and
maintain local economies is about as well developed as that of recognized
states of which they are still notionally a part.”
The survival of separatist regions lies in establishing their armed forces, allowing them
to maintain control over territories. They are also able to structure and maintain their
economy which has given them the opportunity to better educate their youth. State
recognition has been difficult for most de facto states to gain; however, it is not completely
out of reach. Berg and Toomla (2009) found that some de facto states have received some
type of recognition (negative, boycott, toleration, and quasi-recognition) allowing them to
gain status on the international stage.
Kolstø (2006) finds that some separatist groups use what resources they have in
building their defensive forces. Availability of natural resources to the separatist group
plays a critical role in developing these forces. The funds provided by external actors allow
them to successfully capture and sell resources, giving them the capital to invest in arms
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and soldiers (Ross 2004). Heraclides (1997: 684) conducted a study of 77 cases between
1945-1996 and found that the state achieved military victory 21 percent of the time, while
separatists only achieved victory in 10 percent of cases. Winning 10 percent of conflicts
shows the importance of military resources for any group fighting the central state because
of the rarity of successful separatist outcomes. The degree of militarization is critical for
any separatist group because military resources are crucial for the survival for any
separatist group. However, separatist groups that receive military assistance from foreign
actors restrict the opportunity for a peaceful reintegration and national recognition (Florea
2017: 337-38). While separatist groups are less likely to reintegrate after engaging in
conflict, what is essential for this research is the group’s likelihood of survival, for which
reintegration is not necessary.
There is, however, value in understanding how these de facto states fail. Heraclides
(1997: 689) contends that separatist regions fail because they have lost foreign military
support and can no longer maintain their fight against a central state. The author argues
that separatist groups do not have the resources needed to ensure they can maintain their
territory. This conclusion indicates that separatist groups survive by maintaining armed
forces, selling their natural resources, and receiving some type of political recognition. It
also shows how critical military support is to a separatist group maintaining their de facto
state status. However, these conclusions fail to explain why external actors are motivated
to offer aid to separatist groups.

12

Separatists and External Actors Relations
The affiliation between separatists and external actors is critical to understand
why external actors establish relations. The sub-literature on this topic analyzes
secessionist and external actors’ relationship in separatist wars specifically. According to
Bélanger, Duchesne, and Paquin (2005) democratic states rarely help separatist
movements in other democratic states, but this pattern does not correspond to autocratic
states. Temporal limitations restrict the study, yet it does provide insight into how states
decide what separatist groups they establish relations with. Heraclides (1990) examines
the relationship between external actors and separatists. The author’s findings show that
support via arms and funds are motivated by tangible gain, yet some states became
involved for intangible reasons. Yet, Heraclides fails to discuss what type of arms and
funds external actors provided to separatist groups. Saideman (2002) and Cartmen and
James (1997) examined how groups receive support, finding that ethnic politics was the
major influence for states deciding to support certain groups; however, Saideman fails to
discuss what type of support separatists receive from external actors. These findings
depict how foreign states use instruments to influence separatist wars but do not directly
provide answers as to how the aid impacts the secessionist probability of survival in the
war. The precise causal mechanism to explain how external aid helps secessionist groups
survive is thus an area that is critical but under-researched. Therefore, we can now look
at the effectiveness of external actors’ types of aid and recognition and how that impacts
the outcome for a separatist group.
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External Actor’s Effectiveness and Outcomes
An external actor’s effectiveness in determining the outcome of a separatist war
depends on the type of support they have provided. Separatist groups are demonstrably
able to maintain their territory by having an armed force and managing their local
economies. Yet, sometimes separatist groups acquire additional support to ensure that they
can maintain control of their territory and resources. Varying types of aid may be provided
to support them. Florea (2017) lists four types of variables that affects de facto state
survivability: military support from outside actors, state building, fragmentation within
separatist groups, and veto players.
Florea (2017: 349) finds “Military support from an external actor resulted in
reducing separatist incentives to negotiate.” Military aid from external actors “…[I]njects
vital lifeblood into the arteries of a de facto state by providing rebels with the resources
needed to prevent forceful reintegration (Florea 2017: 340).” Receiving military aid
strengthens the separatists’ chances of surviving and provides them the opportunity to
maintain their fight against the central government. Military aid improves the outcome for
separatist groups because it allows them to avoid being forced into an agreement that falls
short of their expectations.
Also, certain world powers, like the U.S., offer diplomatic support to ease tensions
for separatist regions that have been economically isolated from the rest of the world (Pegg
and Berg 2016). The separatist groups that are supported by the U.S. are treated poorly,
potentially damaging their chances of survival (Pegg and Berg 2016: 284). External actors
have given funds to separatists so that they may buy arms and train soldiers to accomplish
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their missions (Ross 2004). The financial support from foreign governments increases
separatists’ incentives to continue fighting, impacting their chances of survival (Ross
2004). Furthermore, Coggins (2011) finds that when one or more great powers recognized
a separatist group, it increases the likelihood that others recognize it. The author argues
that external politics plays a critical role in state recognition and thus in separatist
movements having a successful outcome.
Furthermore, external actor support ensures their survival by providing them with
the necessary military aid and moral support. Additionally, timing is crucial to the survival
of a separatist group; the earlier that an external actor begins supporting the group the more
likely that they survive (Byman, et. al. 2001: 10). Receiving military aid is critical for a
successful outcome for a separatist group, and adding moral support only solidifies the
probability of survival for the group. Timing is also critical for a separatist group, and the
earlier the external actor provides support, the greater chance for a successful outcome.
Although any kind of external dependence hurts the separatist group’s status on the
international stage and their strategy in gaining independence (Caspersen 2009), Ozpek
(2014) discusses from a realist approach how external actors’ national interest weighs
heavily if a regime recognizes a separatist group. Hence, the possibility arises for a
separatist group to appeal for moral support from external actors because of mutual
interests or national kinship. This research provides insight into how the effectiveness of
foreign state assistance impacts the survivability of separatist groups but does not directly
provide answers as to which type of support most impacts survivability. Therefore, my
research bridges this gap in the literature by building a nuanced argument for which type
of aid improves the likelihood of separatist survival. To highlight the impact of access to
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foreign military aid to the success of a separatist region, the following sections will reveal
the causal mechanisms behind a successful and failed separatist war.
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III.

Successful Separatist Case Study: Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)

The Kosovo War is recognized by many scholars as an example of a successful
separatist case. The case illustrates the importance of external support for separatist
survivability, specifically the impact of military aid. The discrete impact of these
concepts can be operationalized through a quantitative analysis to determine the
relevance of external support’s impact on separatists’ survival. The Kosovo case is a
prime example of how an external actor can provide military aid, economic aid, and
moral support to improve the separatist group’s chances for survival. Furthermore, it
exemplifies how military aid has the largest impact on ensuring separatist survivability
during the war and beyond.

Historical Background
In 1998-1999, the Kosovo War was described as a humanitarian war by the West
because of the ethnic cleansing committed by Serbian soldiers operating within the
Yugoslavian forces. The actions of the Serbian forces and the Kosovar Albanians resulted
in clashes and disputes over territorial control. The violence against innocent civilians led
to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in 1999 and paved the way
for international recognition for the state of Kosovo. The events precipitating this conflict
provide greater context for the separatist war that took place.
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Kosovo is located in the southernmost province of modern-day Serbia and was one
of two autonomous provinces in Yugoslavia (Dempsey 1998: 95; Smith 2001: 2). In 1912,
during the Balkan War, the Serbs were successful in acquiring the Kosovo region (Smith
2001: 2). During World War II (WWII), Axis powers were able to acquire control of
Kosovo in 1941, the control of which they proceeded to hand over to Albania (Dempsey
1998: 96). In 1946, after the end of WWII, Kosovo was returned to Yugoslavia and given
autonomous status (Dempsey 1998: 97). In 1963, Kosovo was upgraded to an autonomous
province and eventually in 1981 gained full republic status by utilizing force; however, the
ruling was met with opposition from the Communist Party of Serbia (Dempsey 1998: 97).
In 1989 and 1991, Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević removed Kosovo’s autonomous
status, which lead to Kosovo forming their own government and seeking independence
(Dempsey 1998: 97). The people of Kosovo had experienced the opportunities of autonomy
only to have the government authorities remove their status. The Serbian government was
not without justification, however, as terrorist activities perpetrated by Kosovan separatists
led to the decision to remove their autonomy.
In December 1993, in response to the Serbian government’s oppressive tactics, the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was created (Mulaj 2008: 1108). KLA’s goal was to
achieve independence from Yugoslavia and even claimed responsibility for bombings that
occurred in the southern part of the country (Dempsey 1998: 94). The KLA had acquired
funds through a variety of illegal activities, including selling drugs, prostitution, and
extortion networks (Özerdem 2003: 80). Furthermore, in the early 1990s, the KLA devoted
the majority of their attacks to sporadic assassinations against Serbian police, before
moving to hit and run attacks in the mid-1990s (Mulaj 2008: 1112). In late 1996, the KLA
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conducted 15 attacks against the Serbian police in which 15 were killed and 2 injured
(Mulaj 2008: 1112). These terrorist attacks by the KLA led the Serbian government to
create plans to counter these incidents.
In February 1999, Serbian leader Milošević introduced “Operation Horseshoe” to
combat the KLA (BytyÐci 2015: 133). The goal of Operation Horseshoe was to “eliminate
KLA and initiate cleansing of Kosovo of Albanians” (BytyÐci 2015: 133). The
international community felt that Kosovo was an internal state issue for Serbia, and decided
to not intervene (Mulaj 2008: 1109). The atrocities committed by Serbian forces against
Albanians in Kosovo led to consternation from leaders around the world, particularly the
UN. On March 31st, 1998, the UN Security Council initiated a resolution condemning both
sides for their acts of violence and demanding that both cease their activities (BytyÐci
2015: 133). Eventually, after the continued hostile acts committed by the Serbian troops
against the Kosovo Albanians and the failure to reach an agreement with Milošević, the
international community decided to take action.
Kosovo Albanians were offered various opportunities for autonomy, only to have
their central government strip that right away from them. The Serbian government proceed
to commit atrocities against the Kosovo Albanians; however, the international community
decided to take action to become involved by utilizing NATO’s diplomatic and military
resources to challenge Serbian leaders and its military.
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External Actor’s Involvement
The international community was dismayed by the atrocities that were committed
by the Serbian forces in Kosovo. NATO initiated negotiations with Milošević but failed to
reach a resolution. The intention of NATO’s initial involvement was to create a solution to
a political crisis that had turned into a diplomatic failure (BytyÐci 2015: 136). NATO
created a plan, “NATO OPLAN,” which consisted of 3 phases. Phase 1 was to establish air
superiority, Phase 2 was to attack military targets south of the 44 degrees north latitude,
and Phase 3 was to expand air operations throughout the region (Arkin 2001: 4).
Eventually, NATO OPLAN was later renamed Operation Allied Force (OAF) with the
intended goal to drive Serbian troops out of Kosovo (Smith 2001: 1). NATO defended their
plan of intervention by utilizing Chapter VII Article 2, Paragraph 4, which allows the use
military force for humanitarian means in a regional conflict (BytyÐci 2015: 134). The
atrocities that the Serbian troops had already committed in Kosovo left NATO with no
other option but to use military force as a means to prevent a disaster from occurring.
On March 23, 1999, NATO’s Secretary General Javier Solana authorized the use
of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Serbian forces (BytyÐci
2015: 139). NATO commenced OAF at 19:45 Central European Time (CET) on March 24
by conducting air operations. NATO’s involvement was to find a solution for the Kosovo
Albanians who had their autonomy stripped away on countless occasions and were being
repressed by their central state. The only option NATO had to find a solution for the
Kosovo Albanians was to use their military resources against the Serbian opposition.
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NATO’s Military Aid
NATO’s military resources proved to have a critical impact on the KLA in the
Kosovo War. NATO targeted key facilities, such as: “airfields, army bases, munitions
storage facilities, engineer depots, arms and heavy equipment factories, petroleum storage
facilities, smelters, and an aviation repair base (Haulman 2015: 17).” In particular, NATO’s
air forces hit 40 military facilities, with 400 flights hitting the anti-aircraft defense network
and 300-350 aircraft hitting refineries, fuel depots, and military barracks (BytyÐci 2015:
143). NATO had success in targeting the Serbian military because of the mutual sharing of
information with the KLA (Mulaj 2008: 1113). The KLA was able to provide key Serbian
military positions to NATO’s bombers, which gave the KLA an advantage against the
Serbian forces. NATO’s targeting capability and the KLA’s strategic guidance proved a
winning combination, allowing the combined forces, though overstretched, to cover over
40% of Kosovan territory (Koktsidi and Dam 2008: 170).
NATO was also successful through more diplomatic measures. As Haulman (2015:
16) states, “A combination of military and diplomatic pressure ultimately succeeded in
convincing Milosevic to accept a peace deal.” Therefore, the KLA greatly benefited from
NATO’s strategic bombing which allowed them control of over 40% of the territory.
NATO’s military aid helped pressure Serbian leader Milosevic to accept a peace deal but
it was a combination of NATO’s targeting and KLA’s territorial control made the NATO
intervention so impactful, ultimately forcing Milosevic to accept the peace terms. It should
be noted that diplomatic pressure played a critical role, and we will discuss how NATO
countries utilized their diplomatic networks later in this section.
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NATO’s Economic Aid
The successful conclusion to the Kosovo War saw the NATO powers establish U.N.
Security Resolution 1244, which consisted of the United Nations Interim Administration
in Kosovo (UNMIK), tasked with state-building and transferring administrative duties to
Kosovan officials and institutions (Woehrel and Kim 2008: 5). Furthermore, NATO, the
UN, and the European Union (EU) provided substantial monetary support to help the KLA
and Kosovo rebuild the region and allow Kosovo to pursue state recognition. Since 1999,
UNMIK and EU has provided Kosovo with a total of close to $40 Billion for infrastructure
development and state-building (Džihić and Kramer 2009; Elbasani 2018). The goal was
to catalyze economic development and advise on rule of law institutions (Džihić and
Kramer 2009: 14). Additionally, the EU utilized 14,500 Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops for
security measures to ensure stability (Džihić and Kramer 2009: 2). KFOR’s other goal was
to enforce the provisions of the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) and the
demilitarization of the KLA (Woehrel and Kim 2008: 12). The monetary support and
security forces provided by NATO and other organizations has provided an opportunity for
Kosovo to establish nationwide stability and pursue state recognition. Therefore, the
economic aid that was provided to the KLA helped provide Kosovo a path to statehood as
long as they followed the guidelines set by UNMIK and the EU. It is unlikely that any
substantial economic development could have been achieved without the presence of
NATO’s military forces. The establishment of KFOR has also allowed officials to focus
on state-building and development for the region.
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NATO’s Moral Support
KLA’s goal was to establish their autonomy and successfully secede from Serbia.
However, this was initially unlikely because of world powers opposing their
independence (Woehrel and Kim 2008: 12). In 1998, the U.S. designated the KLA a
terrorist organization (Özerdem 2003: 80). This condemnation of the KLA, which would
restrict much of the NATO support required to establish statehood, stood as an early
barrier to Kosovan statehood. Despite this, the international community established the
Ahtisarri Proposal for Independence, which the U.S., NATO, and EU supported, while
Russia needed more time to make a decision (Woehrel and Kim 2003: 17). The result of
the proposal was inconclusive, yet eventually granted Kosovo the right to seek
membership in international organizations and recommended eventual independence
(Woehrel and Kim 2003: 17). The proposal’s controversiality meant it was not agreed
upon unanimously in the international community, which lead to the Troika Talks. The
Troika Talks were similar to the Ahtisarri proposal in its attempt to establish the future of
Kosovo; however, the talks could not reach a mutual agreement (Woehrel and Kim 2003:
18).
Ten years after the start of the Kosovo War, Kosovo declared its independence in
February 2008 (Cottey 2009: 594). Kosovo was officially recognized as a “Contact
Group” which consisted of some of the main powers of the international community. As
stated by Mulaj (2008), “KLA’s historic recognition occurred at Rambouillet and Paris
international conferences (February and March 1999) by France, Germany, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States (1109).” The U.S. and United Kingdom (U.K.)
organized their diplomatic networks to help Kosovo achieve their independence status.
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Specifically, they encouraged other countries to recognized Kosovo’s statehood by
consistently using the UN Security Council meetings to pressure other states (Newman
and Visoka 2018: 380).
Since the recognition from the G7 countries and its established independence,
Kosovo’s state recognition has gained traction. According to BytyÐci (2015: 176),
“Kosovo’s independence has been recognized by the United States of America, France,
UK, Germany, and Turkey. As of July 2013, 110 countries, among which are 22 EU
states, and all G7 countries have recognized Kosovo’s independence.” Kosovo has seen a
resounding amount of support from the international community following their
secession from Serbia.
In sum, Kosovan independence could not have been achieved had the U.S. and
U.K. not utilized their diplomatic network and status to pressure states to recognize
Kosovo. Moreover, the military aid from NATO further legitimized Kosovo’s quest for
independence. NATO’s resources and diplomacy were therefore crucial in helping the
KLA achieve independence. Its willingness to intercede on behalf of the KLA and devote
valuable resources to the cause had an irrefutable impact on the success of the secession,
the effectiveness of which is quantified in the following research.
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External Actor Effectiveness and Outcome
NATO’s use of their resources was effective in shifting the war in KLA’s favor
because hitherto, KLA’s troops were not successful in pushing Serbian troops out of the
region. Utilizing air power had already been established as an effective option for
countries that intervene in conflicts (Pashakhanlou 2018: 39). Air raids allow the
intervening country to make an impact on the conflict without sacrificing thousands of
ground troops. NATO launched air raids against FRY without support from China and
Russia (Pashakhanlou 2018: 42-43). NATO claimed that the Kosovo Albanian population
were being targeted by FRY forces, particularly Serbian police and paramilitary forces,
which led them to decide that the only option to stop these acts was through military
force (Pashakhanlou 2018: 42). Furthermore, the KLA was provided military aid by the
U.S., Germany, and Switzerland (Mulaj 2008: 1111). In addition to providing military aid
to the KLA, NATO also used air support to give them an advantage over Serbian forces.
The KLA was aided by NATO’s air raids on Serbian infrastructure, which were
crucial to their war effort. According to Pashakhanlou (2018: 43), “NATO utilized 38,000
aircraft sorties who conducted 10,500 strike missions and 12,000 tons of munitions, making
it the alliance’s largest air operation to date.” Eventually, in the final days of the war, the
air power used by NATO had significant success in hitting Serbian military targets (Gallis
1999: 7). The number of weapons and ammunition that were provided and used by NATO
against the Serbian forces helped place pressure on Milošević to come to an agreement.
NATO’s military aid forced Serbian leader Milošević to come an agreement with
NATO and KLA, known as the Kumanovo Agreement. The agreement was signed on June
9th and began the process of ending the conflict and withdrawal of Serbian forces (BytyÐci
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2015: 153-178). NATO’s military aid played a critical role in the outcome of the war. Their
aid was effective in helping secure KLA’s victory by applying pressure on the Serbian
opposition, which forced the Serbian leader into agreeing to end the conflict. Moreover,
this allowed Kosovo to finally receive the state recognition that they had been seeking since
they declared self-determination. Next, it is imperative to look at how the NATO
intervention with military aid increased the likelihood of survival for Kosovo because of
the success they had in the international community and how they have managed to
maintain their independence.

Probability of Survival
NATO’s involvement dramatically improved Kosovo’s probability of survival
because of their military resources. NATO’s continued presence in Kosovo allowed the
KLA to maintain control of their territory which ensured their independence. According to
BytyÐci (2015: 179-88), “Kosovo was turned into a protectorate that was divided into five
sectors with 6,000 German and Turkish forces in the South, Italian forces in the West,
6,100 French forces in the North, 7,400 U.S. forces in the East, and 6, 200 Great Britain
forces in the Center.”1 NATO had established ground troops, also known as Peacekeepers,
to maintain security and repel any possible attacks from the central government.

1

See figure 3.1 below.

26

Figure 3.1

Who controls Kosovo? The Economist. June 24th 1999.

In summary, NATO’s aid had a tremendous impact on Kosovo’s probability of
survival. The pressure from the aerial bombing and the economic investment by NATO
and its allies improved Kosovo’s chances of survival. Moreover, the presence of troops has
solidified Kosovo’s independence and has ensured their probability of survival within the
international community. The presence of NATO has provided legitimacy for Kosovo
because without the military resources, the chance of Kosovo surviving is reduced. In sum,
military aid is crucial for the separatist group’s probability of survival and that is why it is
imperative to discuss the implications.
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Implications
NATO’s military aid played a critical role in improving Kosovo’s probability of
survival against the FRY and Serbian central state authority. The KLA would not have
been as successful in their bid for self-determination without NATO ‘s military aid,
economic aid, and moral support. NATO’s air support and cooperation with the KLA was
strategic in helping the group maintain control of 40% of their territory. Furthermore, it
helped them apply pressure on the central state to come to an agreement to grant them
autonomy. Moreover, NATO’s economic aid was vital for the KLA to help them begin to
develop their institutions, while their diplomatic pressure convinced states to recognize
them. Ultimately, none of the above would have been possible had NATO not provided
military aid to the KLA during the war nor provided stability after the war so that they
could build institutions and gain recognition.
NATO intervened in the Kosovo conflict because the KLA provided pragmatic and
strategic benefits to the western organization. NATO was able to establish bases to
challenge potential Russian aggression and exert greater influence in Eastern Europe.
Furthermore, by supporting the KLA, NATO was able to create an alliance with a
subnational group in the region allowing for further westernization of the fledgling state.
Establishing a security partnership provides long-term benefits for both NATO and KLA
because it allows NATO to counter other states that may try to influence the region and
increases Kosovo’s state legitimacy. Therefore, there are tangible benefits that attracted the
external actor (NATO), which motivated its aid to the separatist group (KLA) to improve
its likelihood of survival.
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IV.

Failed Separatist Case Study: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

The Kosovo War provides an excellent example of a successful separatist case
because of the impact that NATO had on the outcome of the conflict. However, there are
cases in which external actor support is unsuccessful. The Sri Lankan Civil War provides
a unique case because of the external support the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) received from India between 1983 and 1987. The Sri Lankan Civil War is
technically a separatist war because the LTTE is seeking to establish their autonomy. The
withdrawal of this support post-1990 provides a unique opportunity to analyze the impact
of external support on the same separatist organization. After analyzing the impact of
external support (or the lack thereof) on the LTTE over three decades, the LTTE is
compared to the KLA to quantify how external actor support impacts the survival of a
separatist group.

Historical Background
Tamil nationalism increased with the creation of the Sri Lankan state in 1931
(Hariharan 2008: 37). During the 1940s and 1950s, Tamil nationalists demanded to
receive state representation and eventually requested to become a federal state. The goal
was to counter the Sinhala policies that discriminated against the Tamil community
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(Hariharan 2008: 37). Specifically, the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948 and the Sinhala
Only Bill discriminated against the Tamil community by declaring them noncitizens and
making Sinhala the official language (McConnell 2008: 62-3). The systematic
discrimination by the Sri Lankan government caused the Tamil leaders to take action and
defend their homeland.
The Tamil separatist movement was created out of frustration toward the ethnocentric
policies put in place by the Sri Lankan government (DeVotta 2009: 1021). Tamil
leadership announced the right to self-determination for their homeland in 1976
(McConnell 2008: 65). The declaration for the right to self-determination was followed
by the creation of armed groups taking up the cause. According to Hussain (2008: 81),
“The Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam was founded by Vellupillai Prabhakaran on
March 5, 1976, the day he conducted a successful bank robbery in Puttur.” The LTTE
committed more than common crime; they were known perpetrators of many terrorist
attacks. Similar to the KLA, the LTTE purchased their arms through the black market
with ill-gotten funds from bank robberies, drug trafficking, and welfare fraud (Abel 1995;
Herinrich 1986). According to Samaranayake (2007: 178), LTTE attacks between 1984
and 2004 killed 3,045 civilians while injuring 3,704. These attacks frequently utilized
terror tactics as the LTTE resorted to using car bombs and assassinations of political
leaders (Ministry of Defense, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 2011; Kaufman
1996).
The goal for the separatists was to establish their own independent state, which
consisted of the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka (Pfaffenberger 1995: 130).
According to McConnell (2008: 72), the “Tamils’ homeland has been occupied by the
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military of successive Sri Lankan governments. LTTE was engaged in an armed struggle
based on the right to self-determination because of the acts of genocide committed by the
Sri Lankan government.” In 1977, the Sri Lankan elections saw the Tamil United
Liberation Front (TULF) vote on a mandate for a separate Tamil state, precipitating the
conflict (Sarvananthan 2018: 2). The roots of the conflict were LTTE territory claims
and Sinhalese Buddhist politicians ensuring the dominance of the Sinhalese Buddhist
population throughout Sri Lanka (Devotta 2009: 1022). The violence between the Sri
Lankan government and the LTTE lead to the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA).
According to DeVotta (2009: 1028), the PTA “allowed security forces to arrest and hold
anyone suspected of subversive activities incommunicado and without trial for up to 18
months. Many Tamils were caught and tortured under the PTA.” The repressive tactics
used against the Tamil community violated their right to self-determination, which forced
them to take up arms.
The Tamil conflict has seen at least four different phases to the war with the last
occurring from 2006-2009. The Tamil community wanted to establish their own state by
declaring self-determination. However, the repressive policies that were carried out by
the Sri Lankan government prevented the Tamil community from achieving that dream.
Those policies forced the Tamil community to create groups that would fight for their
cause; yet, even though the LTTE were able to put up a fierce fight against the Sri
Lankan government, they failed to achieve their goal of an independent state.
The lack of external actor support hurt the LTTE’s chances of winning their
independence. Ultimately, the Sri Lankan government forces were able to capture the lost
territory that the Tamil separatists had acquired throughout the war. Unlike the KLA in
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Kosovo, who received military aid from an external supporter, the lack of an external
actor sealed the LTTE’s fate as they could not withstand the counter offensive by the
central state; they simply did not have access to the requisite supplier of military aid.
LTTE’s early successes, which occurred concurrently to support from an external actor,
were brutally reversed throughout the 1990s and 2000s.

India’s Support (1983-87)
The LTTE did not have the continuous external support that the KLA received in
Kosovo; however, the LTTE did receive support from India until 1987. Between 19831987, India provided military aid on their soil, where they trained LTTE soldiers
(Hariharan 2008: 38). India was the only external actor to provide any kind of support to
the Tamil separatists and was eventually considered counterproductive by later Indian
administrations because of their official policy of LTTE marginalization (Pfaffenberger
1995: 135). In 1985, India tried to negotiate a ceasefire between LTTE and the Sri
Lankan government in Thimpu, Bhutan, but both sides failed to reach an agreement at the
summit (Hariharan 2008: 39). Eventually, after realizing the danger the LTTE posed, the
Indian government sent in peace-keeping forces in support of the Sri Lankan government
to help stabilize the region (Pfaffenberger 1995: 135).

India’s Military Aid
The LTTE’s early success against the Sri Lankan government would have been
reversed were it not for India’s intervention. The Indian intelligence, Raw and Analysis
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Wing (RAW), provided weapons training and battlefield strategy to LTTE fighters. As
stated by Sengupta and Ganguly (2013: 112),

“The RAW, India’s external spy agency, implemented India’s
strategy of diffusion of the Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents by opening bases
and training camps mostly in the Ramanathapuram district in southern
Tamil Nadu. The RAW training typically consisted of field craft, tactics,
map reading, jungle and guerrilla warfare, and training in weapons system
such as light and medium machine guns, automatic rifles, pistols, and rocket
propelled grenades. Instructions regarding how to use bombs, lay mines, and
establish telecommunications were also provided.”
The RAW support that the LTTE received improved their chances of survival on
the battlefield and throughout the war. Specifically, the LTTE’s fighting capacity was at
its peak when receiving military aid from India. Between 1983-1987, the LTTE’s control
of Sri Lankan territory grew; however, they did not completely control their entire
territorial claim, which covered over half of the coastline and major port cities.
Ultimately, the LTTE did control a majority of the Northern and Eastern provinces
(Fourman 2014: 104). The LTTE was able to utilize the training by taking control of
major ports and coastline of Sri Lanka, which gave them the advantage over government
forces. Therefore, the military aid provided by India improved the LTTE’s likelihood of
survival because they were able to use that training to defeat Sri Lankan government
forces at strategic locations. Economic aid provided by India also proved essential in the
continued LTTE struggle for independence, as examined in the following section.

India’s Economic Aid
India’s military aid proved to have a significant impact on the LTTE’s likelihood
of survival against the Sri Lankan government forces. However, although military aid is
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critical for a group’s chances of survival, additional types of aid help maintain their fight.
India provided crucial economic aid to help sustain LTTE forces and civilians.
Specifically, the Indian air force provided food and supplies to LTTE in the city of
Jaffna, which is a key port city in northern Sri Lanka (Sengupta and Ganguly 2013: 11314). India’s economic aid made a larger impact on the LTTE’s chances of survival
because it allowed them to maintain their fight against the Sri Lankan government forces
until they ceded control to Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF). Therefore, we can
assume that the economic aid provided additional support to the LTTE’s fight and
ensured that they could sustain themselves for some time. India also provided moral
support, which may also have impacted the LTTE’s chances of survival.

India’s Moral Support
India’s military and economic aid was critical for their chances of survival against
the Sri Lankan government forces. During the period of Indian external support, 19831987, it is difficult to find any evidence that India provided any moral support to the
LTTE. Any Indian moral support was initiated by the Tamil Nadu population in southern
India because of anger towards the Sri Lankan government and their actions. India’s
government was hesitant to intervene on the LTTE’s behalf. The Indian government
initiated covert support to the Sri Lankan government in the form of military and
economic aid. India unsuccessfully tried to mediate various negotiations between Sri
Lanka and LTTE between 1983-1987. Eventually, these unsuccessfully interventions led
to the India government sending the IPKF to help defeat the LTTE and put an end to the
fighting. The failure to obtain India’s moral support seemed to hurt the LTTE’s chance of
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survival, and to an extent, the LTTE did lose momentum. However, that did not last long
as seen in the following Eelam wars that occurred. Therefore, moral support did play a
factor in ending the first Eelam war; however, India’s military and economic aid provides
crucial information for this study. As in the KLA case, military aid was crucial for the
separatist group. The training provided by India to the LTTE provided them the necessary
skills to defeat Sri Lankan forces and control key ports; therefore, providing the
advantage in mediation talks. It is clear that this aid rendered the LTTE separatist
movement sustainable and played a critical role in their early successes in the 1980s
period of the conflict.

Lack of External Actor (1991-2020)
As this section focuses on external support that occurred from 1991 to present, the
external support from India is disregarded because it occurred before the observed years.
From 1991 to present, the LTTE was not as fortunate to receive the external support that
they had received in 1980s. 2 The LTTE by this point had a reputation as a dangerous
organization and the international community targeted them. Over 30 states within the
international community designated the LTTE an international terrorist organization
(DeVotta 2009: 1040). Many of these states declared the LTTE as the main obstacle to
resolving the conflict (DeVotta 2009: 1040). The LTTE did not provide any support to
counter these accusations; they continued to violate ceasefires that had been agreed upon
with the Sri Lankan government.

2

According to W. Alejandro Sanchez Nieto (2008), Singapore and Burma are weapons suppliers for LTTE;
however, that could not be verified (578).
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The LTTE suffered from not having an external actor to provide support during
this period, such as was afforded them by India in the 1980s. The LTTE’s reputation also
ultimately diminished the likelihood of another external actor providing aid, a crucial
difference from the KLA in the Kosovo war. Furthermore, by violating ceasefire
agreements, the LTTE continued to portray themselves as a volatile separatist movement
that only wanted to cause destruction. This reputation the LTTE created made it difficult
to justify any UN member to politically support them.

External Actor Military Aid
The absence of an external actor is not always the clear reason why a separatist
group is defeated by the central state, but in many cases this factor plays a critical role in
the outcome of the conflict. Theoretically, any time that a separatist group receives
support from an external actor, the group’s probability of survival should improve. In the
case of Kosovo, we saw the KLA’s probability of survival improve greatly by receiving
military aid from NATO. On the other hand, in the LTTE case, the absence of aid from
an external actor hurt their probability of survival. At the time, when India was providing
military aid to the LTTE in the 80s, the separatist group was successfully took control of
entire regions of Sri Lanka. After India ceased providing aid in 1990, the LTTE failed to
maintain control of those regions.
The Sri Lankan military force was larger than the LTTE which gave them a
distinct advantage. According to Nieto (2008: 578), “Sri Lankan armed forces (numbered
around 240,000) against Tamil rebels (10,000).” The LTTE was outnumbered by Sri
Lankan forces and would have benefited significantly from receiving military aid from an
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external actor. By 2004, the LTTE had lost 70% of the territory that they had controlled
since the 1980s (Fourman 2014: 103). Military aid from an external actor would have
helped the LTTE to maintain territory that they had successful taken. Moreover, the
external actor’s military aid would have given the LTTE the opportunity to repel counter
offensives that the Sri Lankan government forces launched against them in 2008 and
further diminished LTTE forces. Despite these reversals, a key reason why the LTTE
may have been able to continue their conflict throughout the years could be the weapons
training and battlefield strategies that India provided them. The lack of military aid had a
critical impact on the LTTE for several reasons, yet they were able to continue the
struggle for an additional 18 years, perhaps in part because of the Indian training that
some veterans may have passed down. Ultimately, the lack of military aid was a death
sentence for the LTTE.
In sum, additional military aid would have improved the probability of survival
for the LTTE by providing them the extra resources necessary to allowed them to survive
the counterattack that the Sri Lankan government launched to recover the land they had
lost. In the Kosovo case, military aid was vital for them to fight the central government
and gain legitimacy. Therefore, the LTTE had initial success against their central
government; however, they failed to maintain their position and succumbed to the central
government forces.

External Actor Economic Aid
The LTTE benefited greatly from India providing economic aid in 1987 which
allowed them to continue to fight until India decided to shift their position. In particular,
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as with the lack of military aid, a lack of economic aid hurt the LTTE. There is no
evidence that an external actor provided the LTTE with economic aid from 1991 to
present. The lack of economic aid was a blow to the LTTE because they did not have the
luxury of providing resources to their fighters as they once did in 1987. The lack
economic and military aid greatly diminished the LTTE’s likelihood of survival because
they did not have the necessary resources to keep fighting against the capable Sri Lankan
military force. Since the LTTE did not have military or economic aid, it is important to
analyze how moral support impacted their chance of survival.

External Actor Moral Support
The LTTE’s failure to establish an independent Tamil state was caused by not
having external actor support to fight the Sri Lankan government. The Indian government
played a critical role in shaping the international community’s perception of the LTTE.
As stated by Sengupta and Ganguly (2013: 118), “India’s stance against the LTTE,
convinced U.S., U.K., and Canada to designate LTTE as a Terrorist Organization.” India
heavily influenced some of the great powers of the world to declare LTTE a terrorist
organization. Furthermore, India utilized their diplomatic networks to depict the LTTE as
a ruthless terrorist organization that murdered thousands of innocent civilians (Sengupta
and Ganguly 2013: 119). The LTTE’s criminal activity, including smuggling and drug
trafficking, only reinforced India’s claims which impacted the international community
decision to not support their self-determination movement.
30 states in the international community considered the LTTE the root problem of
the Sri Lankan war, making it a challenge for the separatist group to convince any
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country to provide them military aid. The international community’s negative perception
of the LTTE meant few, if any states were willing to support the separatist group for fear
of diplomatic repercussion.
The LTTE’s geographic location may have dissuaded any external actor from
providing military aid because the LTTE presented few tangible advantages or benefits
for an external actor. Moreover, LTTE’s leader, Prabhakaran, failed to exploit any of
their territorial or military gains to establish political legitimacy (DeVotta 2009: 1040).
The failure to utilize political gains, as well as the lack of resources or strategic
geography ultimately eliminated any opportunity for states to give the LTTE legitimacy.
The failed legitimacy from any state made the LTTE’s fight for self-determination
difficult to achieve because they were viewed as the problem and not the solution to the
conflict. This case fortifies the argument that receiving military aid from an external actor
is crucial to a separatist group establishing legitimacy because if the external state views
the separatist group as a liability, the likelihood of receiving aid is slim; however, if the
potential external actor viewed the group’s fight for self-determination as righteous the
chances are high. Therefore, the probability of survival for the LTTE was slim because
unlike the KLA, the international community did not see its cause as legitimate and
would not provide military aid because of their reputation.

Probability of Survival
The LTTE was defeated by the lack of external actor support and in particular
military aid. On January 2, 2008, the Sri Lankan government pulled out of the 2002
ceasefire agreement which was mediated by Norway and successfully recaptured LTTE
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occupied territories (Wickramasinghe 2009: 59). The successful offensive was crucial in
helping end the conflict spanning over four decades. The LTTE’s likelihood of survival
was slim because although they were able to fight the central government forces for
decades, they could not maintain their cause for self-determination due to the lack of
military aid. In the Kosovo case, military aid was critical for the separatist group’s
survivability. The LTTE did have external support from India initially, though it was not
as comprehensively supported as the KLA was by NATO, which led to them failing to
repel the counteroffensive that the Sri Lankan government forces launched in 2008.
Receiving military aid from an external actor would have increased their likelihood of
survival because it would have provided them an opportunity to maintain control of their
occupied territories and establish legitimacy for their cause of self-determination. In sum,
the lack of external actor aid from 1991-present hurt the LTTE’s probability of survival.

Implications
The LTTE’s case provides insight for why military aid increases the chances of
survival for a separatist group. The LTTE had great success in their initial fight for selfdetermination when supported by India. However, once the LTTE lost this aid, they
failed to maintain control over their captured territories, which was a crucial blow. The
failure to hold this territory is linked to not having the necessary military aid to continue
their fight. The LTTE failed to take political advantage of the territory they had captured,
but I think you should expound on that here. If they had used their control of that territory
to secure autonomy or semi-autonomy, especially with India’s tacit support, they could
still have their independence today. Furthermore, the KLA had success in maintaining
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control of their territory because of the targeted bombing NATO provided. The LTTE did
not have the same level of support from India, which made it difficult for them to hold off
the central government forces’ counterattacks. Yet, the LTTE’s reasons for not receiving
external actor military aid go deeper than lack economic aid and moral support.
In order to receive any type of external aid, a separatist group must have some
kind of strategic importance. The LTTE did not represent territory or resources of
strategic importance to any great powers, nor did the prospect of supporting them offer
any pragmatic benefits for an external actor to gain. Sri Lanka sits just south of India and
does not provide any significant ports for an adversary to utilize, and does not offer any
potential for the formation of a security partnership because they are isolated from the
rest of South and Southeast Asia. Therefore, an external actor would be taking a great
risk by supporting the LTTE because of the lack of potential they offer.
In sum, the LTTE case provides insight as to why an external actor would provide
a separatist group with military aid. The LTTE did not provide any strategic benefits for
an external actor to establish relations with them because ultimately, they failed to
provide an alliance that could benefit a regional power outside of India. Supporting the
LTTE with military aid would be unappealing to an external actor because it would
necessarily challenge India; therefore, hurting their chances of being able to influence the
rest of Asia. The LTTE case reveals the importance for a separatist group to offer
pragmatic benefits to a potential external actor. Without this, a strategic alliance for an
external actor to provide military aid is unlikely.
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V.

Research Design and Analysis

Case Selection, Dataset, and Limitations
The case studies of the KLA and LTTE were selected to provide significant insight
about some of the concepts that have an impact on the probability of survival for
separatist groups. Specifically, we selected both cases to illustrate the effectiveness of
military aid is to a separatist group’s probability of survival. A quantitative analysis of 75
cases looking at external actors’ support for separatist groups, over 29 years from 1991 to
present, should shed light on the frequency of these occurrences and establishes a
correlation between external actor support and an increase in the probability of survival
for a separatist group.
This analysis hopes to contribute to the literature on separatist survival by identifying
three essential variables. My research utilizes Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)
External Support Dataset (2011) database to establish quantitative support for three
variables. These variables are [1] Military Aid, [2] Economic Aid, and [3] Moral Support.
Furthermore, World Bank GDP Per Capita (2020) data is utilized to analyze an external
actor’s wealth. If the external actor has a larger GDP then they are expected to provide
more aid, while lower GDP is expected to correlate to a lower likelihood of providing
aid. There are limitations to this research; only 75 cases were observed, which makes
statistical significance more challenging to achieve. The 75 cases that were identified are
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the universal separatist cases for the time period observed. I verified that in each case
observed, the separatist group wanted to establish their independence; any case where
this did not occur was excluded. Only three cases provided data on economic aid that
external actors gave to separatist groups because most states do not disclose support for a
separatist group; which further limits the results for this research. Furthermore, these are
three bivariate results and are not conclusive. They are indicative which suggests that
further research is needed along these lines. Additional control factors, such as proportion
of a group’s population that are fighting for succession and military power of the host
country would help further clarify this research.
Lastly, this research conducted for the exclusive intent of establishing whether there
is a difference in impact from various types of aid on the outcome of a conflict. If there is
a distinction, then further research is needed. The findings here are thus necessarily
preliminary.

Operationalizing Dependent Variable
For the dependent variable, the various levels of survival for a separatist group are
analyzed. Survival is operationalized on a scale from [0,1,2,3,4], with [0] representing
failed secession, [1] indicating secessionists still fighting but have not succeed, [2] de
facto state, secessionists have limited recognition, [3] secessionists have general
recognition but not universal, and [4] secessionists achieved independence and have
received recognition from a majority of the world. The concept of survival is defined by
whether a group has achieved the necessary success that is prerequisite for independence.
These measurements provide insight into how likely it is that a group will survive.
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Groups are also measured by strength, which is expected to correlate strongly with
survivability and thus achievement of independence.

Operationalizing Independent Variables
The goal of this research is to find which of these variables has the greatest
impact and most improves the separatist group’s probability of survival. Hopefully, we
can distinguish which variable, or variables are universal to the cases that have been
observed. Specifically, military aid is expected to be the most crucial aid to a separatist
group’s probability of survival

1. Military Aid
Nonstate actors, like separatist groups, do not have the necessary military
resources and thus receiving military aid from an external actor is critical to their
probability of survival. As seen in the Kosovo case, the KLA’s probability of survival
improved dramatically when NATO began their air operations and targeting strategy
against the Serbian government forces. On the other hand, in the LTTE case, military aid
from India improved their ability to enter into conflict with Sri Lankan government
forces. However, the lack of military aid from 1991 to present damaged the LTTE’s
chance of surviving because it did not have the external support that could have improved
their odds against the government forces. Military aid can provide a variety of benefits
for the separatist to use to their advantage against the central government.
The military aid variable is measured on an index ranging from [0] to [5], with [0]
no external actor support being the lowest level of support, [1] weapons and troop
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training provided by advisors, [2] advisors providing organization and insight for combat
operations, [3] provides small arms ammunition, armored personnel carriers, artillery,
tanks, fighter jets, helicopters, missiles, and attire, [4] provides security forces to conduct
co-vert operations in support of secessionist forces, [5] external actor armed forces that
provide control over contested territory and/or engage in combat operations against the
central government, which is the highest support a separatist group may receive.

2. Economic Aid
Most separatist groups do not have the wealth to support a conflict against their
parent state. Some separatist groups may have the fortune of possessing resources that
originate in their region to sell for weapons and supplies, but that narrative is not relevant
to this research as separatist groups need outside support. Also, external actors become
involved because they are self-interested and will initiate support to a separatist group if
there are tangible gains. We saw that NATO helped sustain Kosovo and KLA for a
decade after the war ended, while the LTTE only received limited supplies from India,
which did not last.
The economic aid variable is operationalized as an average of money groups
received from an external actor. The lowest level of support that comes from an external
actor ranges from $0 to $399 million, the next level of support ranges from $400 million
to $799 million, and the highest level of support ranges from $800 million to $1 billion or
greater.
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3. Moral Support
In the international community, to become a state, it is imperative to have a
majority of the world provide recognition. The probability of survival for a separatist
group trying to establish legitimacy and independence depends on how the international
community perceives their self-determination movement. In the case of the KLA, the
U.S. and U.K. utilized their power and positions to pressure other states to recognize their
independence. While for the LTTE, India used their influence to convince great powers
to designate them as a terrorist group. Establishing “De Facto State” status does not
exactly achieve the status of independence that the separatist group strives for because
they are still under the control of the central state. Therefore, it is crucial for a separatist
group to receive recognition from a majority of the world to gain the independence they
have strived to achieve.
The moral support variable is measured on an index ranging from [0] to [4], with
[0] showing no external recognition as the lowest level of support, [1] acknowledgement
of the secessionist, [2] expression of solidarity with an external actor, [3]
diplomatic/formal ties with the secessionist, and [4] recognition of independence as the
highest level of support that a separatist group can receive.
All measurements for the three independent variables were run through a
hierarchical multiple regression to determine the optimal model.
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Hypotheses
In separatist wars, having resources is a crucial aspect for any side to improve
their probability of survival. Secessionist groups receiving economic investment from
external actors can improve their chances of surviving a war against governments.
Groups receiving such support will also have the opportunity to buy food and textiles for
their fighters, which could potentially boost the morale of their fighters. The lack of food
and clothing is one of the biggest reasons why secessionist groups do not have enough
fighters. Running out of food could lower morale and result in thousands of fighters
joining the adversary’s forces. Having food and proper clothing, could also help fighters
endure rough climate conditions to continue fighting. Furthermore, the secessionist group
can also use these funds to pay their fighters. Receiving payments may increase their
fighters’ resolve to stay and continue to carry on the fight against the government. The
payments that their soldiers receive may also increase their support for the war because
they may have grievances against the government for their lack of support that they did
not receive as citizens.
Another way secessionist groups may use the economic funds from external
actors is in the covert operations area. The group can use the funds to produce
propaganda against the government with the goal of persuading the rest of the population
to buy into their cause for fighting against the government. The external actor can help in
this area by providing them with materials to buy handouts for the public. Also, they may
have the chance to use the funds to buy radio or news stations to further express their
ideology for why they fight, while using these stations to provide information on the war.
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They can influence the population by showing that they are winning the war via these
outlets. Lastly, secessionists can use the economic aid to fortify their defenses to ensure
that they can maintain captured areas. The external actor, depending on the state, can give
the secessionist group a greater amount of economic funding that will allow them to
continue the fighting which improves their probability of survival, which leads to the first
hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: As an external actor’s economic aid increases the secessionist
group’s probability of survival improves.

Although external actors may be able to provide economic support to secessionist
groups, they can also provide military aid in various ways. The secessionist groups are
not able to provide enough or adequate weapons for their fighters when they are engaged
in combat. The lack of equipment hurts the separatist’s chances of winning the war and
they may seek assistance elsewhere. Therefore, it seems that the government forces are
able to outlast separatists when they encounter each other on the battlefield. However,
external actors can step in and provide support to separatist groups to improve their
probability of survival.
External actors can provide secessionist groups weapons, ammunition, or troops
to aid them in their fight against the government. Giving them more modern weapons
than they could otherwise access can improve their chances of surviving fights against
government forces. Having new weapons can also improve the morale of the soldiers
who are fighting because it gives them the sense that they are fighting for a just cause
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against the central government. The external actor takes their rebellion seriously, giving
the fighters a greater sense of self-worth and respect. Also, the improved accuracy of
these weapons can lead to more favorable combat outcomes for separatist forces, which
could turn the tide of war in their favor.
Furthermore, external actors’ military aid can provide training to separatist
soldiers. Receiving the proper training can improve the secessionist fighters’ physical
health, improving their performance in combat with government forces or when enduring
difficult climate conditions. The training can also give the secessionist groups an
opportunity to have more effective strategies when engaging the government forces by
using the external actor’s combat methods. Another key component for training
secessionist forces is giving them a chance to extend their lives and continue to fight for
longer periods.
External actors can also provide support by sending in special forces who can
provide combat strategies to the groups. Generals, or special forces can give secessionist
groups firsthand assistance in planning a strategy when going into battle. Sometimes
leaders in these groups may not have proper education on battle tactics and can therefore
hurt their sides chances of surviving the war. Furthermore, having special forces fighting
alongside the secessionist fighters can improve the probability of secessionist survival
because the special forces can guide them through the battle and provide them with the
necessary support. Lastly, the external actor can send in their military to reinforce the
separatist group and provide stability for the occupy area.
Secessionist groups that receive military aid from external actors improve their
probability of surviving the war. However, even though there is a chance of them not
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winning the war, there still is a chance that their fighting will intensify over time. The
weapons and ammunition that they receive could allow them to confidently face more
substantial government forces. The weapons and training will improve their chances of
survival and allow them to fight with more intensity. Also, having generals or special
forces that have proper education and training only further improves their chances of
taking strategic areas from government forces. Finally, the external actor may send in
their military to reinforce and maintain stability for the separatist forces and their area of
interest. The secessionist fighters may become inspired by receiving aid, therefore, they
will continue to fight with more intensity which could improve their probability of
survival. This discussion provides the second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: As an external actor’s military aid increases, the secessionist
group’s probability of survival improves.

Furthermore, after the external actor provides secessionist groups with economic
and military aid, the external actor may use moral support to appeal to the secessionists,
and the ethnic population that reside within the region. The external actor may use
speeches to call for unity and cooperation from both sides. Also, external actors may
discuss historical connections to the region which they believe rightfully belongs to them
and thus that they have a right to protect. The moral support may also motivate the
secessionist fighters to continue to pursue their cause. Also, this may encourage the
secessionist fighters to fight with more intensity because they believe that they are not

50

only fighting for their region, but for the country that supports them. This discussion
leads us to the third hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: As an external actor’s moral support increases, the secessionist
group’s probability of survival improves.

Finally, all three types of aid are inextricably correlated to the probability of
survival for separatists. However, military aid offers the highest probability of survival
for any separatist group because of the impact it has on the conflict. Military aid allows
separatists to maximize their chances of survival by using weapons, armed forces, and
military advisors from the external actor to challenge the central political authority.
Essentially, the argument is made here that economic aid provides the highest probability
of survival for separatists because of the investments that are made by the external actor.
However, it is military aid that triumphs over economic aid because it is the fundamental
resources like weapons, armed forces, and military advisors that increase the probability
of survival for separatists. Therefore, this discussion leads to the final hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: Military aid increases a secessionist group’s probability of
survival more than economic aid or moral support.
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VI.

Results and Discussion

In Table 6.1, the variables perform as follows:

In the first model, all three variables are present and have not reached to 1.96
threshold to achieve statistical significance, most likely because of the limited number of
cases. Since none of the variables achieved statistical significance, each variable was run
separately to see if they have any significant impact. All variables should be run
simultaneously but this is not possible. When running each variable separately, in Model
2, Military Aid does have statistical significance at 2.57. In Model 3, Moral Support has
statistical significance at 2.36. Finally, in Model 4, Economic Aid does not have any
statistical significance because it has a 0 and is thus disregarded in the ensuing models.
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It was expected that Military Aid would have the most significance, followed by
Economic Aid. Moral Support was expected to have the least significance. However, the
results show otherwise. The mixed results from these models demand further research as
there seems to be unexpected significance to these variables. Military Aid is the most
significant variable, yet Moral Support is the second-most significant while Economic
Aid is the least impactful variable. Economic Aid may be the least significant because of
the limited evidence of external actors supporting separatist groups economically. Further
research may reveal how an external actor’s economic aid impacts separatist groups.

Table 6.2
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There is evidence that Military Aid and Moral Support have statistical
significance. This begs the question, does military aid from the three major powers have a
stronger impact? In Table 6.2, we further break down the variable of Military Aid, and
analyze the three major powers of the world, namely, The People’s Republic of China
(PRC), The United States of America (USA), and Russian Federation (RF). These nations
are classified as the three world major powers because they are widely considered to
control the world’s most powerful militaries. Remarkably, even though these three
countries are the top three, In Models 5-7, Military Aid for all three powers does not
achieve statistical significance. These findings intimate that it does not matter where
military aid originates, so countries like Senegal or Nigeria can have just as much of an
impact as the PRC or the USA.

Table 6.3
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In Table 6.3, Moral Support is examined in a similar manner as Military Aid and
statistical significance is achieved. When combining tables 2 and 3, it was expected that
receiving support from the PRC and RF is the best option for a separatist group to
survive, yet these findings contradict that assumption. The instability of this data causes
the contrast in statistical significance between Moral Support and Military Aid and
explains why there is an increase in Moral Support.
Ultimately, the PRC’s Moral Support is more important than the USA’s. The
findings here express that the PRC has a larger impact than the USA. If the PRC shows
support, perhaps it has a stronger impact on the probability of separatist survival because
they listen to the PRC’s strategies. There are various explanations for why this may be
the case; for example, separatist groups that receive support from the PRC may be
exclusively located within the Asian region, where the PRC has regional hegemony
status. The host country could feel pressure from the resources that the PRC could
provide for the separatist, which may embolden the separatist group to continue to fight
and increase their probability of survival. Although in Model 10 Russia’s Moral Support
variable does achieve statistical significance, the combined variable “Moral Support”
does not achieve statistical significance, either. The instability of this data may be the
cause of this failure to achieve statistical significance for the Russia Moral Support
variable.
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VII.

Conclusion

The recent Russian intervention in Georgia (2008) and Eastern Ukraine (2014)
has shown the relevance of an external actor’s support for a separatist movement. The
prevalence of these conflicts emphasizes the need for continued research into external
actor support for separatist groups, and its impact on their survivability. The variables
analyzed here shed new light on how external aid improves the probability of survival for
separatist groups. The crucial part of this research is understanding which type of aid
gives the separatist groups the greatest chance of survival. Further research is needed
before conclusive arguments can be extrapolated from this research.
The literature on separatist survival is broad; however, there are limitations to
how pervious scholars have analyzed which type of aid impacts survival. For this
research, the variables were chosen logically, based on what was most crucial for what
improves the probability of survival for a separatist group. Military aid and moral support
were found to be most relevant in the majority of the observations, yet economic aid’s
impact was difficult to confirm. The KLA and LTTE case studies provided further
emphasis for the impact of military aid on the survivability of a separatist group.
It should be noted that there is a clear distinction between the type of military aid
that was provided to the KLA and that provided to the LTTE. The military aid the KLA
received included NATO air support that targeted central government positions and
helped push back government forces. NATO’s support allowed the KLA to maintain
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control of their limited territory. On the other hand, the LTTE only received weapons and
battlefield strategy training from India. The critically important air support and strategic
targeting provided to the KLA was denied to the LTTE. It is obvious that one type of
support made a larger impact then the other, which made be the difference in how it
impacts the survivability of a separatist group.
Future research is still needed in this area. The lack of economic aid data is still
essential to the overall understanding of its impact on separatist survival. Although this
research failed to find extensive data on economic aid for the 75 cases observed, future
research may have the capability to establish the impact of this variable. Another avenue
for future research is looking at the likelihood for why certain separatist groups are
provided aid and others are not. Some separatist groups may not feel it is necessary to
accept foreign aid for fear that it may hurt their legitimacy. Furthermore, external actors
may not feel that there are any benefits to supporting certain groups. Finding this
evidence could provide stronger insight into the survival of separatist groups. Finally,
because of the lack of cases for this research, future new detailed data from sources like
Uppsala Conflict Data Program could benefit this research. Adding more data could
provide greater insight into this research and stronger analysis which could further our
understanding of separatist survival.
This article finds that military aid and moral support improve the probability of
survival for a separatist group. A deeper analysis reveals that military aid among the three
major powers (PRC, USA, RF) does not have a greater impact than from other sources.
Thus, any country providing aid can have just as much of an impact as them. Further, we
find that Moral Support from the PRC has more of an impact than the other two powers
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(USA and RF), which is perhaps decided by the effectiveness and location. The
distinction between the PRC’s Moral Support and the USA’s Moral Support could stem
from the lack of stability from the USA’s executive branch. Stability plays a crucial role
for separatist because it provides security and reassurances that the external actor may
never withdraw their support. The USA’s inconsistent leadership may create mistrust
from the separatist group because although the current President may support them, the
future President may not have the same interest to support them. The PRC’s consistent
leadership could appeal to the separatists accepting their support because as oppose to the
USA’s ever-changing executive branch, the PRC can maintain support for a longer
period. However, it should be noted that the majority of the PRC’s Moral Support in this
research occurred at the beginning years because we know that it is unlikely that the PRC
would support any modern separatists; therefore, some caution should be taken when
considering this impact.
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